A Philosophical Explanation of Hypostatical Union in John Damascene's Fount of Knowledge
Anna Zhyrkova, Th.D.
Department of Philosophy
Tel-Aviv University
After the great Arab invasion (VII-VIII), Monophysism, which had been suppressed under the imperial rule, flourished in Syria and Palestine and there was nothing to prevent it from penetrating into former imperial territories. Thus, it is not surprising, that John of Damascus, known as a defender of the orthodox faith, found it necessary to rise his voice against these Christological heresies. Monophysites of the time were known by several names: Egyptians, Jacobites, Severians, Aphthartodocetea and Acephali. Protesting against the Monophysite heresies Damascene had written several works, namely On the Composite Nature against the Acephali, The Letter on the Thrice Holy Hymn (Trisagion) and The Tome against the Jacobites. Yet he had presented positive treatment of hypostatical union of Christ in one of his most important works The Fount of Knowledge. In its first part, Dialectic or Philosophical chapters, he defined notions, utilized to solve the philosophical problem of unification of two natures in human hypostasis. On this basis he explained the unification of human's and God's nature in one hypostasis of the Son of God in the third part of the mentioned work, i.e. The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.
Defending Chalcedon formulation, according to which there are two natures in one person of Jesus Christ, John of Damascus claimed that heretics look upon nature and hypostasis as on the same thing without differentiating between them (Exp. 47, 39-40)[1]. Consequently, they conclude that if after the hypostatical union there is only one hypostasis of Christ, then, in Him must be only one composite nature.[2] Thus, to solve this theological problem, we should inquire the exact meaning of mentioned terms.
On the one hand, according to John of Damascus, the holy Fathers paid no attention to differences between the terms 'substance' and 'nature', for the term 'substance' (ousia) is derived from 'to be' (to einai) and 'nature' (fusis) - from (to pefukenai), and, as a matter of fact, both of them mean the same thing (Dial. 31, 26-27). On the other hand, following Aristotle,[3] Damascene defines nature as the principle of motion and repose, and, on this ground, he identifies nature of subject with its substance (Dial. 41, 2-7). Yet, John of Damascus adds that, according to some pagan philosophers, in contrast to substance, which is simple being, nature is "substance which had been made specific by essential differences so as to have in addition to simple being, being in such a way" (Dial. 31, 4-7). Thereby, it seems that substance qua substance, to which belongs simple being, is amounted to unqualified subject. Nevertheless 'nature' as 'substance which had been made specific by essential differences' relates to qualified substance, or in other words to substance of certain kind, which is specified by the essential difference. Thus, it has not only being in the former sense, but also being in such a way according to its essential differences. Hence, we may conclude that simple being corresponds to the basic existence, while specific being is a way of existence of informed substance according to essential difference, or in other words, existence of some specific species. Consequently, 'nature' corresponds to the notion of the most specific species, such as angel, man, horse, etc. (Dial. 31, 7-19).
Even though John of Damascus has claimed that this interpretation of nature had its roots in pagan philosophy, in his treatment of hypostatical union he used the term 'nature' in the meaning of substance qualified by essential differences. Essential difference, according to Damascene, assures the existence of species and is a constituent of substance. Hence, for essential difference and its opposite it is impossible to be in the same species (Dial. 5, 103-110). Likewise, it is impossible for the substance of man to comprise being rational and irrational, or mortal and immortal. Thus, substance, since it has no contrary in itself (Dial. 48, 20-21), cannot be made from two substances, which are constituted by diverse specific differences. Similarly, it is impossible for one compound nature to be made from two substances, i.e. from two natures (Dial. 42, 16-17).
Indeed, according to John Damascene, human nature can be considered as one nature of man only in the sense of common specie, since man is composed of two substances, namely of soul and body (Exp. 47, 40-50). Yet, in the case of Christ even a common species cannot be admitted: "for there never was, nor is, nor ever will be another Christ of deity and humanity, the same being perfect God and perfect man". Christ cannot be called even an individual, since there is no species, which could be predicable of Him. Thereby, it is absolutely impossible to speak about one nature in any sense of this term in relation to our Lord Jesus Christ (Exp. 47, 50-54).
We must, however, admit that according to Damascene's teaching, nature (similarly to substance, genus, species, or accident) does not subsist by itself. Independent existence belongs only to individuals, or in other words to hypostases and in them are found substance, nature, etc. (Dial. 43, 8-11).
In Philosophical Chapters the term 'hypostasis' occurs in two meanings. According to the first meaning, which, as stated by John Damascene, was used by the holy Fathers, hypostasis is a simple existence. The second meaning signifies "the existence of an individual substance in itself", that is "individual, which is numerically different", e.g. Peter and Paul, or this horse (Dial. 43, 2-7). As a matter of fact, Damascene used the above term in the second meaning, i.e. in the sense of an individual substance, which exists in itself and is numerically different.
John of Damascus ascribes to hypostasis the following characteristics: "the hypostasis must have substance together with accidents and subsist in itself and be sensibly, that is, actually, perceivable" (Dial. 31, 29-31). Thus, hypostasis appears to be the individual substance informed by accidents. Being composed of accidents is necessary for a hypostasis to be different from another hypostases of the same species. Otherwise it would not be possible to distinguish two numerically different hypostases of the same kind, i.e. nature. For the difference between hypostases is in number and not in nature (Dial. 31, 31-34). Therefore, as long as a species is substance that possesses essential difference, for otherwise it would not exist at all, so an individual, in order to exist as such, should be in possession of accidents.
The phrase that hypostasis must "subsist in itself and be sensibly, that is, actually, perceivable" (Dial. 31, 29-31) probably means that, as well certain kind of being concerns substance informed by essential differences, particular existence relates to hypostasis, according to its accidents. Accordingly, simple being amounts to substance devoid of form; when being is informed with essential difference, it becomes 'nature' or a species, which is being in such a way; and when being in such a way assumes accidents it becomes a hypostasis.
Consequently, nature as a species is a common thing, which is predicated of hypostases and has its existence in them, while hypostasis is a particular thing in a numerical sense, as an individual of some kind. Therefore, according to John Damascene, hypostasis not only possess common as well as individual characteristics of the subject, but also exist in itself. By contrast, nature does not exist in itself, but is to be found in hypostasis (Exp. 50, 3-13; 55, 4-7). In addition, nature cannot exist apart from hypostasis. As it was mentioned above, it is impossible for one compound nature to be made of diverse substances. Yet, Damascene claims that it is not necessarily for the united natures to have their own proper hypostasis (Exp. 53, 2-5). Moreover, since hypostasis posses the existence in itself, it could be a principle of existence of two united natures. Thereby, it is possible for one compound hypostasis to be made of diverse natures (Dial. 42, 16-20). For instance human hypostasis is made up of body and soul. And in case of our Lord Jesus Christ, the same hypostasis of the Word has become the hypostasis of divine and human natures.
A thing is hypostatically same and one when two natures are united in one hypostasis and have one compound hypostasis (Dial. 49, 22-28). However, John of Damascus defines the constituents of hypostasis as enhypostaton. According to him they do not subsist in themselves but are contained in hypostases. For instance the enhypostaton could be species, which is not contained in its own hypostasis but in individuals, which belong to that species. Substances that constitute on compound hypostasis are called enhypostata. Thereby, the soul and the body are not hypostasis by themselves but enhypostata. And human hypostasis that consists of both is the hypostasis of both. Admittedly, the enhypostaton is nature that has been assumed by another hypostasis and in this has its existence, as it is with human nature that was assumed by hypostasis of God the Word (Dial. 45, 7-22).
Following Damascene's teaching, the union of two natures or nature with hypostasis, which subsist in one hypostasis, is hypostatic. There are a few kinds of union[4] and, as it was said by John of Damascus, only union by composition in connection with the Mystery of Christ was acceptable to all Fathers. This union "is the mutual association together of the parts without detriment to any of then, as in the case of the soul and the body" (Dial. 65, 104-113). In contrast to the remaining kinds of union, the hypostatical union by composition preserves unconfused and unaltered in itself both the united natures and their differences as well as their natural properties. Though, in case of compound nature it is impossible, since nature as such cannot possess in itself diverse essential differences of its composites. The compound nature will not preserve the composites, of which it has been composed, but will change and alter them (Dial. 67, 39-45). Yet, as long as actual being belongs to hypostasis and not to nature, hypostasis is a principle of being and existence of its composites. United natures, however, contain their existence by participation in hypostasis. In other words, the way of existence of the united natures is not the being of compound nature, but the being of hypostatic components. The united natures remain essentially unchangeable in themselves and different from each other. Nevertheless, characteristic differences of the united natures, by which each of them is distinguished from others, become the differences of compound hypostasis. Therefore, the compound hypostasis essentially differs from its components. Yet, as it was mentioned above, in this case we can speak about one nature, to which hypostasis belongs, only in the sense of common species.
Furthermore, since hypostasis is a principle of being and existence, the constitution of compound hypostasis is a way of being of its composites. Hence, according to John Damascene, the hypostasis as a principle of hypostatical union of natures remains absolutely indivisible. Consequently, human hypostasis composed of the soul and the body preserves substance and difference of compounds distinct and their properties unconfused, while the principle of their union is indivisible. Despite the fact that the soul is separated from the body in death, the hypostasis of both remains one and the same (Dial. 67, 2-24)[5].
Basing on the presented above philosophical analysis of the terms 'nature' and 'hypostasis' we may conclude that, according to the teaching of John Damascene, one compound nature cannot be made of two substances. For it is impossible for contrary essential differences to exist together in one subject. Even though, as it was stated by heretics, after the union Christ had a compound nature, He would be neither of the divine essence, nor of human. For the compound nature cannot be of the same essence as either of the natures out of which it is compounded (Exp. 47, 10-16). Since hypostasis exist in itself and is a principle of their being, two natures can be united and exist in one hypostasis. Thus, the divine and human nature are hypostatically united in one hypostasis of Christ. Yet, as indicated by John of Damascus, in Him not only natures are united to each other hypostatically, but also does hypostasis assume an additional nature. The pre-existent hypostasis of God the Word assumed perfect human nature that is the human soul and the body. The hypostasis of God remains to be a principle for existence of both. However, both natures do not subsist as the independent existence, but rather as hypostatic complements of one hypostasis of Son of God (Exp. 53, 7-17). According to the Damascene, this union is essential in a sense that the union is true and not imaginary. The two natures were united with each other without change or alteration and remain perfect as well as their essential differences are preserved: "For the created remained created, and the uncreated, uncreated: the mortal remained mortal; the immortal, immortal: the circumscribed, circumscribed: the uncircumscribed, uncircumscribed: the visible, visible: the invisible, invisible" (Exp. 47, 19-74). Furthermore, Damascene claims that since both natures from the beginning had existence in one hypostasis, each of them remained in the possession of hypostasis of God the Word, even during separation in death. Thereby "the hypostasis of Christ was always one, since, even though the soul was separated from the body in place, it still was hypostatically united to it through the Word" (Exp. 71, 24-28).
The next question is the problem of originality of Damascene's thought. Special attention should be paid to the first part of Fount of Knowledge where he defines philosophical terms and concepts on the basis of which he explains theological doctrine. The chapters in which John Damascene defines concept of nature, hypostasis, enhypostaton and hypostatic union are generally considered as dependent upon works of Christian authors, such as Anastasius Sinaite, Leontius of Byzance and Maximus Confessor. Bonifatius Kotter and Gerard Richter suggest the following patristic parallels for texts, in which Damascene introduces the definition of nature and concept of being in such a way. For Dialectica 31, 4-6 have been proposed two possible sources.[6] The first, is the text of Anastasius Sinaita, Questiones et Responsiones centum quinquaginta quator, 89, 824B, and the second is almost identical text in Doctrina Patrum de incarnatione Verbi, 39, 19-40, 4, which is also ascribed to Anastasius. According to both texts, substance is the simple existence of beings, while nature relates to simple motion of beings. Yet, the meaning of nature as the principle of its motion follows Aristotle and is different from the idea of being in such a way, which according to Damascene is tantamount to nature. Moreover, suggested sources for Damascene's description of hypostasis in Dialectica 31, 29-33, namely Maximus Confessor, Opuscula theologica et polemica, 91, 276B and Leontius Byzantinus, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, 86, 1277D, present only definition of hypostasis in relation to substance. However, both passages lack Damascene's existential explication of the notion of hypostasis, namely: it must subsist in itself and be sensibly, that is, actually, perceivable. It is noteworthy in this connection that the explication of the mentioned above part of the definition of hypostasis, is found only in Damascene's Dialectica 31, 29-31 and Dialectica (recensio brevior) 11, 29-31. Nonetheless the terms - being in such a way and actually perceivable, except for Damascene's works,[7] are used in a very distant context. It seems that his doctrinal exposition can hardly follow from those sources.[8] To be sure, in Dialectica 45, which considers the concept of enhypostaton, the references to works of Leontius and Maximus, in which enhypostatotn is presented as thing existing in another, are clear.[9] However, the proposed sources luck of the final Damascene' definition of enchypostaton as a one that does not subsist in itself but is considered in hypostasis (Dial. 45, 7-9). Thereby, in contrast to common opinion, it might be concluded that John of Damascus not only presented the compilation of patristic texts, but also put forward some aspects of philosophical concepts that have important role in theological doctrine.
The analysis of Damascene's notions of nature as substance informed by essential differences and hypostasis as particular substance informed by accidents allows for conclusion that the cited passages strongly suggest a Stoic influence.[10] According to the Stoic doctrine, the first genus 'a being' or 'substrate' is generally equated with primary matter viewed in abstraction as 'unqualified', while the second genus is the 'qualified' that is a substance viewed as 'having' (containing as parts) certain qualities. The second genus of 'qualified' divides into the 'commonly qualified', i.e. anything described by a common noun or adjective; and the 'peculiarly qualified', i.e. qualitatively unique individuals.[11] Consequently, as a result of comparing Damascene's metaphysical view to Stoic's doctrine, we suggest that John of Damascus' notion of 'nature' seems to be the equivalent of Stoic's second genus and 'informed substance'; term 'hypostasis' relates to Stoic's 'individual'. Though he does not proclaim knowing Stoic authors and doctrine, his information about the Stoic doctrine could have been deviously acquired from the Neoplatonic and patristic traditions, where some trace of the Stoic doctrine might be discerned.[12] Admittedly, Damascene's concept of Being (simple being, being in such a way and actual existence of hypostasis) seems to be much closer to the distinction between essence and existence that can also be traced in the Neoplatonic tradition.[13]
To sum up: to solve the theological problem of the unification of human and God's nature in one hypostasis of the Son of God and to defend the orthodox doctrine John of Damascus used the notions of nature and hypostasis that were defined in his Philosophical Chapters. Indeed, notions of nature as certain kind of substance and hypostasis as peculiar substance, which exist by itself, allow philosophical explanation of the unification of two natures in human hypostasis as well as the unification of the human and Divine nature in one hypostasis of Son of God. Thus, Damascene claims that "it is impossible for one compound nature to be made from two substances, that is to say, from two natures, because it is impossible for logically opposed constituent differences to exist in the same thing. It is possible, however, for one compound hypostasis to be made from diverse natures, which is how man is made up of body and soul"(Dial. 42, 16-20). Thereby, the actual existence of hypostasis allows explaining not only the problem of man in whom two natures are united to each other hypostatically, but also the question of Christ whose hypostasis assumes an additional nature: "in Him the divine and human natures were united, while His animate body subsisted in the pre-existent hypostasis of God the Word and had this for a hypostasis" (Dial. 67, 25-30). Damascene's treatment of above discussed terms seems to be influenced by Stoic doctrine, while the roots of his teaching could probably be found in the Neoplatonism and Patristic traditions. However, his doctrine seems to be closer to the Christian Medieval philosophy rather than to the Greek or patristic tradition and might be considered as an important improvement of Christian philosophical thought.
Selected Bibliography
Colish, Marcia L. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. 2 vols, Studies in the History of Christian Thought ; V. 34-35. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985.
Corigan, K. "Essence and Existence in the Enneads." In The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, edited by L. P. Gerson, 105-29. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Hadot, P. "La Disitinction De L'être Et De L'étant Dans Le De Hebdomadibus De Boèce." In Die Metaphysik Im Mittelalter, Ihr Ursprung Und Ihre Bedeutung; Vortrèage Des Ii. Internationalen Kongresses Fèur Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Kèoln, 31. August-6. September 1961, edited by International Society for the Study of Medieval Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963.
---. "Forma Essendi: Interprétation Philologique Et Interprétation Philosophique D'une Formule De Boèce." Les Études Classiques 38 (1970): 143-56.
---. "L'être Et L'étant Dans Le Néoplatonisme." Revue de théologie et philosophie 23 (1973): 101-13.
Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Richter, G. Die Dialektik Des Johannes Von Damaskos: Eine Untersuchung Des Textes Nach Seinen Quellen Und Seiner Bedeutung, Studia Patristica Et Byzantina, 10. Heft. [Ettal]: Buch-Kunstverlag Ettal, 1964.
Verbeke, G. The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983.
Notes
[1] In the present paper we shall frequently refer to Frederic H. Chase's translation with some modifications, see Frederic Hathaway Chase, ed., Saint John of Damascus, Writings (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). The numbering of chapters is after the edition of Greek text of B. Kotter, ed., Schriften Des Johannes Von Damaskos, vol. 1, Patristische Texte Und Studien 7 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), vol. 2, Patristische Texte Und Studien 12 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1973).
[2] See John of Damascus, On Heresies, 83.
[3] Aristotle, Physica 192b 21; 200b 12-13.
[4] John of Damascus describes the following kinds of union: by mixture, by welding, by joining, by fusion, by mingling, by coalescence, blending, apparent union, relative, union and union according to dignity. It seems interesting that in this description John of Damascus uses Stoic' terminology. See Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 vols. vol. 1., Studies in the History of Christian Thought ; V. 34-35 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), p. 21-29, 37.
[5] This conclusion has many important theological and anthropological consequences. For instance, the claim that human is a principle of being and existence of its compounds, brings us to the conclusion that soul is not a form of human individual. Rather the constitution of compound hypostasis might be considered as a form of human. Indeed, John of Damascus defines the human soul as a special kind of matter. In his doctrine only God is immaterial (Exp. 26, (II 12) 2-5). The soul as such, than, is particular ex definitione and its individual being should not be proved. Since the human soul exists due to existence of particular human hypostasis, the soul as such could be only the soul of this particular man. Therefore a reincarnation of soul is absolutely impossible. Moreover, since a being of human nature is the being according to existence of composed hypostasis, the existence of human after separation of the soul from the body in death could not be complete and perfect. Thus, it gives rise to philosophical and theological explanation of resurrection of human body.
[6] Kotter, ed., Schriften Des Johannes Von Damaskos, p. 153-9.
[7] The adduced text for " being in such a way" - Dialectica, 31, 6 (the same text in Dialectica (recensio brevior), 11, 4-7), Dialectica (recensio brevior), 11, 6 and Contra Manichaeos, 16, 12.
[8] For 'actually perceivable': Ammonius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium 84, 23-25; Dexippus, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium 34, 11-12; Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium 143, 21-23; In Aristotelis Phisicorum libros commentaria 368, 22-25; 461, 3-5; Syrianus, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentarium 50, 20-24. For 'being in such a way' - Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis meteora comentaria 282, 30 and in Eusebius, ad Euphrationem 1, 10.
[9] See Kotter, ed., Schriften Des Johannes Von Damaskos, 109-10; Leontius Byzantinus, De sectis, MPG 86, 1240C; Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, MPG 86, 1277D; Fragmenta, MPG 86, 2009D-2012A; Maximus Confessor, Epistula 15, MPG 91, 557D-560A.
[10] However Kotter (ibid., p. 107-8, 112-3) and G. Richter (Die Dialektik Des Johannes Von Damaskos: Eine Untersuchung Des Textes Nach Seinen Quellen Und Seiner Bedeutung, Studia Patristica Et Byzantina, 10. Heft ([Ettal]: Buch-Kunstverlag Ettal, 1964), p. 170-1, 175-82) claim that Damascene draws here on Categories of Aristotle or Greek and otherwise unknown Christian commentaries to them.
[11] See Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, 222, 30-3; Syrianus, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentarium 28, 18-19; Dexippus, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium 30, 20-6, and also A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 174.
[12] Kotter, ed., Schriften Des Johannes Von Damaskos, critical apparatus, Richter, Die Dialektik Des Johannes Von Damaskos: Eine Untersuchung Des Textes Nach Seinen Quellen Und Seiner Bedeutung., p. 12-7, G. Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), p. 7.
[13] See K. Corrigan, "Essence and Existence in the Enneads," in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. L. P. Gerson (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 105-29, P. Hadot, "La Disitinction De L'être Et De L'étant Dans Le De Hebdomadibus De Boèce," in Die Metaphysik Im Mittelalter, Ihr Ursprung Und Ihre Bedeutung; Vortrèage Des Ii. Internationalen Kongresses Fèur Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Kèoln, 31. August-6. September 1961, ed. International Society for the Study of Medieval Philosophy., Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Bd. 2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), P. Hadot, "Forma Essendi: Interprétation Philologique Et Interprétation Philosophique D'une Formule De Boèce," Les Études Classiques 38 (1970), P. Hadot, "L'être Et L'étant Dans Le Néoplatonisme," Revue de théologie et philosophie 23 (1973).
|
