Demonstration and Deity: An Eastern Orthodox Christian Reflects on the Ontological Argument of the Fifth Meditation
Michael C. Rhodes, PhD
Department of Theology
Loyola University
I.
Introduction
The ontological
argument of concern here is the one Descartes presents in the Fifth Meditation
of his Meditations on First Philosophy. The notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ is
explicated in section II in relation to material things, mathematical truths
and the ontological argument. Three
formulations of the argument follow as well as Descartes’ own defense of the
argument in sections III and IV respectively.
I present my analysis in section V arguing that given the initial
mathematical definition of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ the ontological argument
is able to show only two types of
existence for a ‘most highly perfect being’: conceptual existence that is dependent on the mind and necessary and abstract existence that
does not depend on the mind. Since this
is the case it follows that necessary and
abstract existence is the highest type
of perfection consistent with the reasoning of the Fifth Meditation and
(therefore) that ‘God’[1] shares the same
ontology as the mathematical truths. I
conclude that the argument can be accepted on three conditions, but granting
the last one in particular results in affirming the existence of a ‘God’ for
whom triunity, incarnation and human salvation is impossible. I then offer a few final comments in the
Epilogue.
II.
Clear and Distinct Ideas
Material Things
The Fifth Meditation begins with the
stated intent to examine whether or not certain ‘ideas’ of material things are
‘distinct’ or ‘confused,’ an intent more basic than an investigation into the
notion of certainty as regards ‘material things’ alone. Descartes puts it like this:
[A]nd nothing seems
to be more urgent now. . . than
that I might try to emerge from the doubts into which I have gone in the
previous days and that I might see whether something certain concerning
material things could be had. And before
I shall inquire as to whether any such things would exist outside of me, I must
surely consider the ideas of these things, in so far as they are in my
cogitation, and see which of these ideas would be distinct and which of them
would be confused.[2]
The question of the
possibility of rational certainty precedes the question of the possibility of
empirical certainty because what is outside of ‘me’ physically is of secondary
epistemological importance to that which is ‘in my cogitation.’ Descartes is concerned with an a priori notion of truth then (hence the
interest in an ontological argument), yet the Meditation begins to take flight
in the third paragraph by referring to the empirical phenomenon of ‘continuous
quantity’ in terms of ‘extension in length, breadth and depth.’ This is because for Descartes the ideas of these
things give way to perception of the a
priori truth value of ‘figures and number’.
Mathematical Truths
Meditation on the ideas of material things
leads Descartes to concentrate on ‘the innumerable particulars of figures,
numbers and movement’,[3] which I shall refer
to as the ‘mathematical truths’.
Associated with these particulars is Descartes’ notion of certainty
deriving from the nature, essence or form of a thing (a triangle for example)
that is immutable and eternal, and is neither feigned nor dependent on the mind
that thinks it. This is an important
passage for the present discussion, so I shall quote it at length:
And what I think is
maximally to be considered here is that I find within me innumerable ideas of
certain things which, even if they would perhaps exist nowhere outside of me,
still cannot be said to be nothing. And,
although they would in a certain manner be cogitated by me at will, they are
not feigned by me, but rather do they have their own true and immutable
natures. So that, when I imagine a
triangle, for example, even if such a figure would perhaps exist nowhere in the
world outside my cogitation –nor would it have ever existed–, there still is,
in fact, a certain determinate nature or essence or form of it, immutable and eternal,
which has not been feigned by me, nor does it depend on my mind: as is obvious
from thence that various properties could be demonstrated about this triangle,
namely, that its three angles be equal to two right ones, that the maximum side
be opposite to its maximum angle, and similar things, which properties –whether
I would want to or not want to– I now clearly recognize, even if I previously
would in no way have then cogitated about them when I have imagined the
triangle, nor would they therefore have been feigned by me. .
. I have always held truths of
this mode –which things, namely, of figures or of numbers or of the other things
pertaining to arithmetic or geometry or to pure and abstract mathematics in
general. . . –to
be the most certain ones of all.[4]
Important for the
ensuing analysis is that this notion of truth is paradigmatic of the type of
truth that the ontological argument works with.
Though derived from what is outside of ‘me’, the ‘clear and distinct ideas’
of the mathematical truths ‘have their own true and immutable natures’
independent of empirical reality and of one’s cognitive faculties. No amount of empirical awareness or rational
reflection is required for the nature and attributes of a triangle to be
precisely what they are; nor is any perception or discernment effective to the
end of changing the nature and/or attributes of a triangle. Some degree of discursion is necessary to
discern the nature and/or attributes of a triangle, however; so using
terminology foreign to Descartes, it is synthetic
a priori truth (necessary truth) that is of concern in the Fifth
Meditation. Furthermore, whatever is
properly related to them in terms of ‘cogitation’ bears the same sense of
immutability and eternality (necessity) by virtue of this relation; for ‘if
from thence alone that I could draw the idea of something from my cogitation,
it follows that all the things that I clearly and distinctly perceive to
pertain to that thing do really and truly pertain to it’. And this line of reasoning suggests a
possibility for structuring an argument for the existence of God: ‘then cannot
therefrom also an argument be had by which the existence of God might be
proved?’[5] The certainty of mathematical truths then is
basic to the ontological argument.
Ontological Argument
The Meditation
continues by introducing the notion of ‘God’ as ‘a most highly perfect being,’
and with Descartes proclaiming that he ‘clearly and distinctly’ understands
‘that it pertains to his (God’s) nature that he always exist’. These assertions form the two premises of his
ontological argument (section III). So
the Meditation turns from a consideration of the question of ‘clear and
distinct ideas’ of material things, that is to say from the certainty of the
‘immutable and eternal’ mathematical
truths, to the question of the ‘clear and distinct idea’ of ‘God.’ The argument is as follows:
I certainly find within me the idea of God,
namely, the idea of a most highly perfect being (entis summe perfecti), no less than I do the idea of some figure or
number. Nor do I understand less clearly
and distinctly that it pertains to his nature that he always exist than that
which I demonstrate of some figure or number also pertains to the nature of
this figure or number. And, therefore,
even if not all the things on which I have meditated in these previous days
would be true, the existence of God must be within my reach at a minimum in the
same grade of certainty in which mathematical truths have hitherto been.[6]
The idea of ‘a most highly
perfect being always exists’ as the
mathematical truths are ‘immutable and eternal’, and since this idea is ‘clear
and distinct’ then it must be the case that it is not empirical and not only
conceptual (that is to say dependent on the mind). The idea ‘God’ is presented here as an entity
like that of a ‘triangle’, and is even commutable with ‘triangle’ in the above
quoted passage in section II as Descartes shows in his reply to Caterus which I
shall treat in the following section.
For this reason I shall present three formulations of the argument. The first version is drawn from the passage
just quoted. The second was presented by
Caterus; and the last was presented by Descartes in response to Caterus.
III.Three Formulations
First Formulation
The argument as I see it should be
formulated as follows:
(i) The idea of God as a most highly perfect
being exists in my mind as does the idea of a figure or a number.
(ii) I perceive clearly and distinctly that a most
highly perfect being always exists as with the demonstration of an attribute of
a figure or number.
(iii) Therefore, the existence of God is at least
as certain as mathematical truths.[7]
Second Formulation
But
Caterus comparing Descartes’ reasoning to Aquinas’[8]
presentation of Anselm’s argument presents the argument as follows:
(i)
God is a
supremely perfect being.
(ii)
And a
supremely perfect being includes existence, for otherwise it would not be a
supremely perfect being.
(iii)
Hence he
actually exists.[9]
This formulation is drawn from the portion of
text wherein Descartes is defending what he dubs an ‘apparent sophism’
concerning the notion that the ‘essence’ of ‘God’ indeed implies the
‘existence’ of ‘God’ which comes after the above quoted section from which I
draw the first formulation.
Third Formulation
Descartes’ reply to Caterus’ objection yields
the following third formulation:
(i)
That
which we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the true and immutable
nature, or essence, or form of something, can truly be asserted of that thing.
(ii)
But once
we have made a sufficiently careful investigation of what God is, we clearly
and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true and immutable
nature.
(iii)
Hence we
can now truly assert of God that he does exist.[10]
I said above that the term ‘God’ in Descartes’
proof is commutable with the term ‘triangle’.[11] The passage that has
just been quoted from Descartes’ Reply to Caterus does just this. He structures this argument from the
reasoning that he presents in the fifth paragraph concerning the nature of mathematical
ideas quoted above in section II. Here
is that argument standardized:
(i)
When I
imagine a triangle there is a certain determinate nature or essence or form of
it, immutable and eternal, which has not been feigned by me, nor does it depend
on my mind [that is to say ‘clear and distinct idea’].
(ii)
From
this idea various properties could be demonstrated about this triangle: its
three angles’ equal two right ones, the maximum side is opposite to its maximum
angle.
(iii)
Hence a
triangle has a true and immutable nature.[12]
Premise one of the
Reply argument contains the content of both premise one and premise two of the
‘triangle’ argument except for the notion ‘triangle’; it is a conceptual
summary of the ‘clear and distinct ideas’ notion and the demonstration of
attributes of these ideas. There is no
mention in premise one of the Reply argument of either ‘triangle’ or ‘God’; the
notion ‘God’ appears in the second premise and in the conclusion. Working on the assumption that ‘God’ is a
‘clear and distinct idea’, premise two of the Reply affirms that ‘existence’ is
an attribute of ‘God’, and the conclusion claims this ‘existence’. It is
interesting to note that the conclusion of the ‘triangle’ argument is
different. That conclusion affirms that ‘a triangle has a true and immutable
nature’, terminology that is repeated in premise one of the Reply argument, but
which was first encountered in the (long) passage quoted above. There ‘true and
immutable’ (veras et immutabiles)
seems to be synonymous with ‘immutable and eternal’ (immutabilis et aeterna). The content of the Meditation suggests
that this notion can only be understood to mean necessary and abstract
existence, but this will be treated in section V.
What this
formulation from Descartes’ Reply to Caterus suggests is that the ontological
argument is conceptually reliant on his notion of mathematical truth.[13] I turn now to a presentation of Descartes’
defense of the argument.
IV.
Descartes’ Defense
Inseparability
Central to the
success of his argument as he views it is the inseparability of the ‘essence’
and ‘existence’ of ‘God’. The reasoning
is like this: if ‘a most highly perfect being’ is a coherent concept, then this
concept must correspond to something in reality, that is to say it must exist
independent of the mind. Coherence of
concepts does not result in other cases in objective existence however. This
holds only for the concept ‘God’ and so might seem dubious at first because ‘since I be accustomed to distinguish the
existence from the essence in all other things, I easily persuade myself that
the existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence that God
can be cogitated as not existing. But to one who is paying attention more
diligently’, Descartes maintains,
it still becomes manifest that the existence
can no more be separated from the essence of God than it can be separated from
the essence of a triangle that the magnitude of its three angles is equal to
two right ones, or than the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of
a mountain –so much so that it would be just as contradictory to cogitate God
(that is, a most highly perfect being) in whom existence would be lacking (that
is, in whom a perfection would be lacking) as to cogitate a mountain from which
a valley would be missing.[14]
It would be nonsensical to speak of a
triangle which has only two angles, or of a mountain which is valley-less. This seems to be commonsense. But it does not seem to be commonsense that
‘essence’ and ‘existence’ would be inseparable in the idea of ‘God’ because it
requires that one assume that ‘existence’ is a ‘perfection’.[15] For Descartes ‘existence’ is an attribute of
‘God’ as the sum of a triangle’s angles equaling 180o is an
attribute of a triangle. The idea of a
triangle contains certain ideas which are inseparable from the idea itself none
of which however is the idea of ‘existence’.
Contained in the idea ‘God’ is the notion of ‘existence’ because it is
an idea of ‘a most highly perfect being’, a being which could not be less than
maximally perfect regarding all of its attributes. Thus, if the attribute ‘existence’ is
contained in the idea ‘God’, then it would be inconsistent to affirm the idea
but exclude one of its defining attributes.
So he offers an a priori argument
for the existence of ‘God’ because he assumes that ‘existence’ is inseparable
from the ‘essence’ of ‘a most highly perfect being’.
But he recognizes that there seems still to
be a problem. For the thinking of a
mountain does not require its ‘existence’ in the world, nor apparently
(therefore) would the thinking of ‘God’ require that ‘God’ ‘exists’ (noticeably
absent here is the prepositional phrase ‘in the world’ in regard to ‘God’. Thus, I take it (again[16])
that he does not mean to imply that ‘God’ ‘exists’ in the world[17]). It seems to be the case that merely thinking
of an idea is not grounds for assuming its objective ‘existence’ (in the world)
as an externally real entity outside of the mind. This seems to be acceptable as regards
mountains and triangles because they are ideas which are essentially devoid of
the attribute of ‘existence’. Mountains
and triangles are ideas that might as it happens be represented by things which
actually do ‘exist’ (in the world[18]);
but they could be ideas without ever becoming actual in terms of ‘existence’
outside of the mind. The subject
‘mountain’ does not contain the attribute of ‘existence’ (in the world) because
there is no necessity in the thing itself which determines the specific
cogitation of mountain as being an idea that necessarily exists (in the
world). The fact that a mountain
‘exists’ (in the world) is an accidental rather than an essential attribute of
the idea ‘mountain.’ One can freely
think of such a thing as a Pegasus, a Unicorn or a Satyr completely apart from
the question of its ‘existence’ (in the world), except that in so far as it is
thought then it ‘exists’ in the world because the mind doing the thinking would
(presumably) be in the world.[19] But the idea ‘God’ is different since it does
contain the ‘perfection’ of ‘existence’.
In so far as the idea ‘God’ is cogitated, then ‘God’ exists outside of
the mind necessarily: ‘not that my cogitation would effect this, or that it
would impose any necessity on anything, but rather, on the contrary, because the
necessity of the thing itself, namely, the existence of ‘God’, determines me to
cogitate this.’[20] The idea ‘God’ is constrained, as it were, by
the necessity of its perfection and so, for Descartes, does not enjoy this
freedom from ‘existence’ independent of the mind as if it were the fancy of a
fairy tale. Necessity accompanies the
idea ‘God’ in a way unique to itself for none of the other ideas, according the
Descartes, necessarily implies the extra-mental, objective ‘existence’ of its
subject, except the mathematical truths as I shall argue in section V below.
Summary
The truths of
mathematics are discerned by way of reflection on the notion of material
extension, and are deemed the ‘most certain’ of all truths. The notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ as
related to ‘God’ is delineated solely in terms of the ‘clear and distinct
ideas’ of these mathematical truths, but is distinct because of the necessary
inseparability of essence and existence.
When Descartes makes use of this concept in his ontological argument the
reader then has only the context of the mathematical truths within which to
understand him. Descartes’ aim in
offering the ontological argument, therefore, must be understood and evaluated
from the vantage point that the mathematical truths are paradigmatic of what
certainty is.[21] The following is an analysis of the argument to this end based on the
first formulation; however, since I shall focus on types of existence and type of perfection attainable by the
argument, my analysis can be applied to the others as well, though I shall not
do so here.
V. Analysis
Premise
(i) The idea of God as a
most highly perfect being exists in my mind as does the idea of a figure or a
number
This premise has three parts. First, it states the definition which
Descartes attaches to the term ‘God’: a
most highly perfect being. Contained
in this definition is the implication that such a ‘being’ would be in
possession of ‘perfection’ in all possible manners. The ‘perfection’ that is central to the argument
is that of ‘existence’. This premise
affirms this ‘perfection’ only in terms of ‘existence’ in the mind. Lastly, it
clarifies how ‘God exists in the mind’: as
does a figure or a number. Thus, the premise can be accepted on the grounds
that it is a definition of the term ‘God’, and claims only that the idea ‘God’
‘exists’ in the mind (i.e. conceptually) like a figure or number.
However, it is not adequately treated in the Meditations. In both the Third as well as the Fifth
Meditation, it is assumed that ‘God’ is ‘a most highly perfect being’, but some
ambiguity is associated with this assumption.
It plays an important role in his argument from ‘perfection’ (Third
Meditation) wherein it is claimed that ‘God’ is the ‘ultimate cause’. In my view, the definition is abstract as I
show in the analysis of premise (ii), and so the argument in the Third
Meditation which attributes a causal nature to ‘God’ together with the
reasoning in the Fifth Meditation is not sound because ‘causal’ is used
equivocally. Interpreted in terms of the
Fifth Meditation, ‘causal’ implies an abstract perfection. Here is an example of what I mean: Given an
indeterminately extended line that intersects both points A and B, this
indeterminately extended line is, therefore, the ‘cause’ of the line segment
AB. But in the Third Meditation,
Descartes clearly uses causal in a different manner, namely as ‘creator’ and
‘preserver’ of himself and all things. Nevertheless, this is not the main
problem as I see it so I would be willing to accept this premise as it is. The
second premise poses the real difficulty.
Premise
(ii) I perceive clearly and distinctly that a most
highly perfect being always exists as with the demonstration of an attribute of
a figure or number
Premise (ii) claims that a most highly perfect being always exists as does the fact that
(e.g.) for all Euclidean triangles the sum of their angles is 180°. This is the case because the idea ‘God’ is
‘clearly and distinctly’ perceived to be ‘a most highly perfect being’ and because
‘a most highly perfect being’ would only be ‘most highly perfect’ if it ‘always
exists’, rather than not existing or only existing for a certain duration or
only in the mind. In this second
premise, Descartes is therefore claiming the ‘perfection’ of ‘existence’ in a
manner distinct from his claim in the first premise. The first premise claims only a conceptual
form of ‘existence in my mind’; this second premise claims a necessary and
abstract form of ‘existence’ as the demonstration of a figure or number that is
‘cogitated but not feigned’ and exists independently of the mind.
As we saw above, Descartes defends this
premise by arguing that ‘existence’ is inseparable from the ‘essence’ of ‘a
most highly perfect being’. Thus,
‘existence’ could not not be part of
what is meant by ‘God.’ The subjects
‘triangle,’ ‘mountain,’ ‘horse’ are similar types of subjects because in
neither of these cases does the thinking of the thing require its ‘existence’
(in the world) which is the requirement of the thinking of the subject
‘God.’ Just in case a triangle actually
‘exists’, then it will have three angles; its angles will be equal to two right
angles (assuming it is Euclidean); just in case a mountain ‘exists’ (in the
world), then it will have a valley; just in case a horse ‘exists’ (in the
world), then it will not have wings.
These subjects can be thought whether they ‘exist’ or not. Thus, according to Descartes, there is a certain
freedom realized in the thinking of these subjects that does not extend to the
thinking of ‘God’: ‘I am not free to cogitate [Him] without existence (that is,
a most perfect being without the highest perfection) as I am free to imagine a
horse with wings or without wings’.[22] These subjects, in other words, might in
principle ‘exist’ in the mind alone, but the subject ‘God’ cannot.
Necessary
and Abstract Existence
The problem I see with this reasoning is that
it denotes only ‘existence’ in the mind and ‘existence’ in the world, though
already implied is a third type of ‘existence’ concerning the mathematical
truths. These are ‘immutable, eternal
and independent of the mind’, neither empirical[23]
(that is to say in the world), nor only conceptual (that is to say dependent on
the mind). ‘And, although they would in
a certain manner be cogitated by me at will’ Descartes maintains ‘they are not
feigned by me, but rather do they have their own true and immutable
natures. So that, when I imagine a
triangle, for example, even if such a figure would perhaps exist nowhere in the
world outside my cogitation –nor would it ever have existed–, there still is,
in fact, a certain determinate nature or essence or form of it, which has not
been feigned by me, nor does it depend on my mind’.[24] I understand Descartes’ affirmation that
‘their own true and immutable natures’ and ‘a certain determinate nature or
essence or form’ together with his denial that ‘such a figure would perhaps
exist nowhere in the world outside my cogitation’ to imply that the
mathematical truths indeed do ‘exist’ outside of the mind, though not in the
world. Thus, this existence I understand
to be a kind of necessary (‘immutable and eternal’) and abstract (‘nor does it
depend on my mind’) ‘existence’. The sum
‘1 + 1 = 2’ is ‘immutable’ because it cannot be otherwise, and it is ‘eternal’
because it is not temporal; so it is necessary.
But it depends on no one’s mind as such; so it is abstract. The inseparability of existence from essence
argument then applies not just to ‘God’, it would seem, but to mathematical
truths as well; for implied in this reasoning is the notion that the
mathematical truths exist in a necessary and
abstract manner.
‘God’ contains the ‘perfection’ of ‘always
existing’ for Descartes. If we
understand this claim in terms of the necessary and abstract existence of
mathematical truths, then it follows that ‘always exists’ can be taken to mean
only ‘always exists as with the demonstration of an attribute of a figure or
number’, as Descartes states in the present premise. A ‘figure or number’, for Descartes, ‘always
exists’ ‘immutably and eternally’ and independently of whether or not it is
cogitated. Thus, the second premise is
only able to further the ‘perfection’ of ‘existence’ by affirming an abstract
‘existence’, an existence that is impersonal like ‘1 + 1 = 2’.[25]
Existence
as Perfection
Understood in this manner, ‘existence’ would
not result in the familiar existence as a perfection problem for the argument
establishes only that ‘God’ exists conceptually
in the mind and necessarily and abstractly
independent of the mind. There would
indeed still remain a problem with conceiving of ‘existence’ as a ‘perfection’
even in this sense; but I have shown that the question now is whether or not
necessary and abstract existence adds anything to the notion ‘God’. Assuming it to be objective in some sense as
opposed to the subjectivity of conception, then it would seem to be the case
that it does. But if this is granted,
the claim that necessary and abstract existence is a ‘perfection’ implies only
the existence of an impersonal entity not ontologically dissimilar to ‘the sum
of the three angles of a triangle is 180°’. And this implies that ‘God’ is devoid of a
‘personal’ nature, a nature to which might pertain characteristics such as
‘self existent’, ‘omnipotent’, ‘omniscient’, ‘omnibenevolent’,
‘omniproductive’, ‘omnipresent’, or ‘longsuffering’,
‘loving’, ‘mighty’, ‘creator’, ‘redeemer’, ‘sanctifier’, ‘trinity’, ‘incarnate’
and ‘savior’.[26]
Conclusion (iii) Therefore, the existence of
God is at least as certain as mathematical truths
The forgoing discussion demonstrates that for the conclusion to be
accepted it must be granted (a) that
necessary and abstract existence is implied by the notion of ‘clear and
distinct ideas’, (b) that it is a
perfection and (c) that it is the
highest type of perfection, each of
which is implied by premise (ii). For
the sake of argument, I shall grant (a) and (b) because the main
problem as I see it lies with (c),
for which there are at least two reasons why it should not be granted. First
because premise (ii) maintains that ‘necessary and abstract existence’ is the
highest type of perfection, but the
conclusion implies that the existence of ‘God’ is more certain than the highest
perfection. This is inconsistent because
the highest type of perfection is by definition not superseded by any greater
perfection, including the existence of ‘God’.
So (c) can be granted only on
pain of equivocation and circularity.
Assuming that there is a satisfactory way of dealing with this, however,
then the argument might still be deemed sound.
I don’t think there is such a satisfactory way, but I cannot deal with
this issue presently, so I shall make the assumption anyway.
More importantly for the purpose of this essay, granting (c) makes impossible both the notion of a triune God, an
Incarnate Savior who has risen from the dead and conquered death by death, and (therefore) human salvation (theosis). The ‘God’ of Descartes’ ontological argument
differs from the Christian conception of God as revealed in Scripture and
Tradition –to whom Jesus Christ taught
his disciples to pray saying Pater imon (Our
Father), and whom the Holy Fathers defended against heresy at Nicea (325),
Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451) for example– because
the Christian conception affirms that God is personal, three persons (hypostaseis) in one essence (ousia),
and that the Second Person (prosopon,
hypostasis), the eternal and only-begotten Son and Word, being one essence
with the Father (homoousion to patri), became one essence (homousion) with man through the Ever-Virgin Mary for our salvation. But why does this matter? The reason is not simply because (c) affirms a non-Christian notion of
God, but because the God of the Christians is both the subject of discourse and
demonstration but also the object of
worship. And the worshipfulness of the
Christian God indicates a kind of perfection greater than necessary and
abstract perfection. My argument then is
as follows. If something is a worshipful
Deity (not merely worshiped as a deity), then it is greater than something that
is not (a triangle or the ‘God’ of the Fifth Meditation for example). Insofar as it can become personally Incarnate
for the salvation of the world, then such a thing is a worshipful Deity. From the evidence of Scripture and Church
history, it follows that the Christian God is understood to be such a
Deity. Thus on grounds that Scripture
and Tradition proclaim a God the perfection of whose existence is beyond
necessary and abstract, then it is also the case that (c) cannot be granted because it contradicts the (scriptural and
ecclesial) self-revelation of God as a worshipful triune Deity who has become
incarnate ‘for the life of the world’ (Jn 6.53).
VI. Epilogue
What has this essay accomplished?
I have shown that Descartes’ reliance on the mathematical truths as the
paradigm of the most certain truths limits what his ontological argument can
affirm of the existence and perfection of ‘God’. To accept (c) one must assume (perhaps tacitly) that worshipfulness is not
greater than non-worshipfulness. If this
assumption is granted then a crucial ontological dimension of this theistic
argument is lost (by presuppositional exclusion) making it intellectual
exercise at best, idolatry at worst.
That dimension has been stressed from the Christian perspective in my
second reason for not accepting (c)
and is what I think of generally as the religious dimension. Taken alone the conclusion of Descartes’
argument does not pose this problem necessarily, but I have shown that it
cannot be accepted on the line of reasoning proffered in his Fifth Meditation
in general and premise (ii) specifically if one assumes worshipfulness to
indicate a greater kind of perfection.
Perhaps Descartes too would not feel obliged not to make this
assumption, but my analysis shows that his argument gives no indication of
this.
Notes:
[1] God will be used in single
quotes (i.e. ‘God’) to designate the referent of Descartes’ ontological
argument in this essay.
[2] René Descartes, George Heffernan
(trans) Meditations on First Philosophy
(Notre Dame: 1992), p. 64. I have also
used George Heffernan (ed, trans)
Meditationes de prima Philosophia (Notre Dame: 1990), but have referenced
the former because it is more commonly known. cf. W Heisenberg ‘Development of
Philosophical Ideas Since Descartes in Comparison with the New Situation in
Quantum Theory’ in Physics and Philosophy
(Prometheus: 1999), pp. 76-92. Here
Heisenberg argues that Descartes’ distinction between ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res
extensa,’ the latter of which having become the primary focus of modern
science, is indefensible according to the contemporary developments in quantum
theory which show that nature and mind are connected in the work of natural
science in such a way that the one cannot be removed from the other except on
pain of incoherence.
[3] Descartes Meditations, p. 64. ‘Not only are these things. .
. plainly known and transparent
to me, but also by paying attention I perceive, in addition, innumerable
particulars concerning figures, concerning number, concerning movement and
concerning similar things, particulars whose truth is so overt and
consentaneous to my nature that, when I first detect them, I would then seem
not so much to learn something new as to remember things that I already knew
before. . . ’
[4] Descartes Meditations, pp. 65 and 66.
See also note 11 below.
[5] Descartes Meditations, p. 66.
[6] Descartes Meditations, p. 66.
[7] Here it is again with
premises and conclusion numbered: ‘(i) I certainly find within me
the idea of God, namely, the idea of a most highly perfect being, no less than
I do the idea of some figure or number.
(ii) Nor do I understand less clearly and distinctly that it pertains to
his nature that he always exist than that which I demonstrate of some figure or
number also pertains to the nature of this figure or number. (iii) And, therefore, even if not all the
things on which I have meditated in these previous days would be true, the
existence of God must be within my reach at a minimum in the same grade of
certainty in which mathematical truths have hitherto been.’
[8] Cf. Summa Theologiae 1.2.1. ‘Objection 2: Further, those things are said
to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the
Philosopher ( 1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of
demonstration. Thus, when the nature of
a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is
greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is
signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally
is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word
"God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it
exists actually. Therefore the proposition
"God exists" is self-evident’.
Fathers of the English
Dominican Province
(trans) Summa Theologica (Benziger
Bros. edition, 1947). cf. Anselm Proslogium, chs. 2-3.
[9] John Cottingham (trans) Descartes: Meditation on First Philosophy,
with selections from Objections and Replies ( Cambridge: 1986), p. 97-8. cf. Heffernan’s ‘Introduction’ in Meditations p. 5 for a presentation
similar to Caterus’.
[10] Text with premises and conclusion numbered: ‘My
argument however was as follows: (i) That which we clearly and distinctly
understand to belong to the true and immutable nature, or essence, or form of
something, can truly be asserted of that thing.
(ii) But once we have made a sufficiently careful investigation of what
God is, we clearly and distinctly understand that existence belongs to his true
and immutable nature. (iii) Hence we can
now truly assert of God that he does exist.’
Cottingham Descartes, p.
100. There are also other
formulations. Of note is Descartes’ well
known geometrico proof in Objections and Replies II. Willis Doney argues (in “Did Caterus
Misunderstand Descartes’s Ontological Proof?” in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss
(Oxford: 1993), pp. 75-84) that this argument is different from that to which
it is supposed to correspond in Meditation Five, and to the argument in Discourse on Method (AT VI 36). See also
Peter Dear ‘Mersenne’s Suggestion: Cartesian Meditation and the Mathematical
Model of Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century’ in Descartes and His Contemporaries ( Chicago: 1995), pp. 44-62.
[11] Using the first
formulation, such a substitution would work out like this: (i) The idea of a
rectilinear figure whose angles’ together equal two right angles exists in my
mind (disregarding the development of non-Euclidean geometries to
which Descartes was not privy). (ii) I perceive clearly and distinctly
that the idea of a triangle always exists.
(iii) Therefore, the existence of a triangle is certain. cf.
Anthony Kenny ‘Descartes’ Ontological Argument’ in Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Vera Chappel, where he argues (in the
context of a larger argument which suggests that Descartes’ principles of the cogito and the existence of God cannot
both be maintained) in what seems to be an effective manner for the notion of
‘existence in thought.’ In a contrived
reply to a criticism that Hobbes had raised against Descartes concerning the
necessity of a triangles’ existing somewhere rather than having no existence at
all, Kenny presents this line of reasoning which seems to be in keeping with
Cartesian thought on the matter: ‘What exists nowhere, neither in the world,
nor in thought, can have no nature, perhaps; but the triangle exists in
thought, and has a true and immutable nature which persists whether or not any
triangles outside thought exist or cease to be’ (p. 179). This argument is revised on p. 180 to include
the givenness of a triangle. On the
Descartes-Hobbes dialogue see Tom Sorrel ‘Hobbes’s Objections and Hobbes’s
System’ and Edwin Curley ‘Hobbes Versus Descartes’ in Descartes and His Contemporaries, op cit., pp. 83-96 and pp.
97-109, respectively.
[12] Text with premises and
conclusion numbered: ‘(iii) And what I think is maximally to be considered here is that I find
within me innumerable ideas of certain things which, even if they would perhaps
exist nowhere outside of me, still cannot be said to be nothing. And, although they would in a certain manner
be cogitated by me at will, they are not feigned by me, but rather do they have
their own true and immutable natures. (i) So that, when I imagine a triangle, for example,
even if such a figure would perhaps exist nowhere in the world outside my
cogitation –nor would it have ever existed–, there still is, in fact, a certain
determinate nature or essence or form of it, immutable and eternal, which has
not been feigned by me, nor does it depend on my mind: (ii) as is obvious from
thence that various properties could be demonstrated about this triangle,
namely, that its three angles be equal to two right ones, that the maximum side
be opposite to its maximum angle, and similar things, which properties – whether
I would want to or not want to – I now clearly recognize, even if I previously
would in no way have then cogitated about them when I have imagined the
triangle, nor would they therefore have been feigned by me.’ The premises deal with ‘triangle’ as an
‘example’ of the ‘innumerable ideas’, but the conclusion with ‘innumerable
ideas. .
. [that] have their own true and
immutable natures’ (Descartes Meditations,
p. 65). The conclusion as I have
presented it in the text above follows the terminology of the conclusion.
[13] cf. W. Doney ‘Did Caterus
Misunderstand Descartes’s Ontological Proof?’ in Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Descartes, ed. Stephen Voss
(Oxford: 1993), pp. 75-84; Jean-Robert Armogathe ‘Caterus’ Objections to God’
in Descartes and His Contemporaries,
pp. 34-43.
[14] Descartes Meditations, p. 66. Italics mine.
[15] cf. Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason Pt.2.2, bk.2.3.4
[incidentally T. W. Adorno suggests that this is a central passage to the whole
Critique in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Polity: 2001), pp. 41-2)]; Norman Malcolm ‘Anselm’s Ontological
Arguments’ in Knowledge and Certainty:
Essays and Lectures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Alvin
Plantinga’s The Ontological Argument
(Doubleday: 1965); G. Dicker ‘Meditation V:
The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God’ in Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (Oxford:
1993).
[16] See comments on p. 3-4, Section
II.
[17] Descartes does not hold that
triangles ever could be empirical data: ‘‘I do not agree that these
[geometrical figures] have ever fallen under our senses, as everyone normally
believes, because though there is no doubt that there could be in the world
figures such as the geometers consider, I deny that there are any around us,
unless perhaps they be so small that they make no impression on our sense;
because they are for the most part made up of straight lines, and I do not
think that any part of a line has touched our sense which was strictly
straight’. . . (AT VII 381)’, quoted in Kenny ‘Descartes’ Ontological
Argument’, p. 179.
[19] Cf. Descartes Meditations, pp. 66-7. The passage I have in mind is this: ‘Granted,
however, that I could not cogitate God except as existing, just as from thence
that I could not cogitate a mountain without a valley: yet, just as from thence
that I would cogitate a mountain with a valley, it certainly does not follow
that there is any mountain in the world, so also from thence that I would
cogitate God as existing, it does not seem therefore to follow that God
exists. For my cogitation imposes no
necessity on the things. And just as it
is permitted to imagine a winged horse, even if no horse would have wings, so also
can I perhaps feign existence of God, although no God would exist.’
[20] Descartes Meditations, p. 67.
[21] For a contrary view see D. E.
Flage and C. A. Bonnen ‘Meditation Five: The Beginning of Descent’ in their Descartes and Method (Routledge:
1999). The argument suggests a
consistency throughout the Meditations
and particularly between Meditation 5 and Meditations 3 and 4. As a result the ‘ontological’ argument of
Meditation 5 is viewed as an ‘interlude’ in a reflection on geometry. Descartes’ ‘true and immutable natures’ are
spoken of in what seems to be Whiteheadean terminology as ‘ideas in the mind of
God,’ thus suggesting a crucial element for how the consistency of this
position is to be established.
[22] cf. Meditations, p. 67.
[24] Descartes Meditations, p. 65.
[25] It is not my contention however that this
conception is what Descartes intends to affirm.
He seems to intend to affirm that ‘God’ is a ‘most highly perfect being’
in a general sense: most highly perfect than all perfect ‘being’ (including
necessary and abstract existence). His
reasoning, however, implies only that ‘God’ can be understood to mean ‘a most
highly perfect being’ in terms of the necessary and abstract existence of
mathematical truth. This understanding
of ‘most highly perfect being’ is the only consistent interpretation of what
the ontological argument can show.
Descartes’ usage of ‘existence’ to imply more than this is equivocal.
[26] On the issue of causality
that I addressed above (I suggested that this claim is equivocal because it is
inconsistent with the notion of ‘perfection’ that Descartes’ Fifth Meditation
delineates), it follows from the present line of reasoning that if the argument
can show consistently only that ‘a most highly perfect being’ ‘exists’ at best
necessarily and abstractly, then Descartes’ claim in the Third Meditation that
‘God’ is the ‘ultimate cause’ is equivocal for this reason too because it is not consistent with what he is able to show in the Fifth Meditation
concerning the ‘existence’ of ‘God’.
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